Written by Atika Abouen
The collapse of the Assad regime has created a new opportunity for Syrian-Lebanese relations. For Damascus, cross-border Hezbollah networks undermine state authority, international rehabilitation, and domestic security. For Beirut, Hezbollah’s armed autonomy compromises sovereignty and complicates diplomacy. Despite historical mistrust between both nations, these parallel pressures create incentives for cooperation. By targeting the cross-border logistical networks sustaining Hezbollah, both governments can advance a strategic interest, the weakening of Hezbollah, without risking a volatile military confrontation.
State Legitimacy and International Reintegration
Syria’s post-Assad leadership has prioritised reversing decades of isolation through targeted counterterrorism. As part of this effort, Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. This approach appears to have reaped diplomatic benefits, reflected in the repeal of Syria's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation on the 24th of August 2026 by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who credited Damascus for targeting Hezbollah alongside ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Iran-aligned groups. Taken together, these developments suggest that action against such actors can accelerate Syria's international reintegration.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s armed autonomy continues to undermine foreign relations. Senior US officials have linked Lebanon’s future relationship with Washington to its success in constraining Hezbollah. In February 2025, US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus established clear red lines regarding Hezbollah’s participation in government. Subsequent American warnings that Lebanese measures remain “not enough” highlight expectations that Beirut must assert superior authority to advance tangible Western partnerships.
A practical incentive for cooperation is Hezbollah’s involvement in cross-border Captagon networks. Manufacturing hubs have operated in Syrian border towns severely affected by displacement, including Madaya and Zabadani, where residents were forcibly expelled by Hezbollah and the former Syrian army. Although these networks' precise contribution to Hezbollah's overall capabilities remains unclear, they nonetheless offer substantial opportunities for joint Syrian-Lebanese action given their cross-border nature.
Rather than risk an open military confrontation, both governments could pursue a less direct approach focused on disrupting the cross-border logistical networks sustaining Hezbollah. Given that Syria serves as an arms and Captagon corridor through which these goods flow into Lebanon, while Lebanon serves as Hezbollah's domestic base, neither state can effectively constrain the group alone. Therefore, cooperation becomes a practical necessity rather than simply a policy preference.
An overt confrontation also carries domestic risks. A direct assault by the transitional government in Damascus risks retaliation from Iran and possibly its proxies, whilst a direct confrontation in Lebanon by the Lebanese state could trigger sectarian violence given Hezbollah’s deep embedment within the Shiite social fabric. By framing cooperation as a joint effort to combat smuggling, strengthen border security, and tackle illegal immigration, both governments can weaken Hezbollah’s infrastructure while also limiting the risk of escalation.
Sovereign Equality and Border Demarcation
Under the previous regime, weak border governance enabled the movement of weapons, fighters, and Captagon across the Syrian-Lebanese border. However, Assad’s sudden collapse changed this reality. During the regime’s final hours, thousands of Syrian Shiites, officials, and Hezbollah associates fled into Lebanon, thereby creating new security concerns regarding weapons trafficking and cross-border instability. As a result, preventing these remnants from acquiring weapons or launching destabilising operations has become a mutual security priority.
Some remnants of the former regime remain active and have carried out limited attacks against Syria’s new authorities. Their links to Hezbollah and shared cross-border supply routes make arms trafficking a significant security priority for Damascus. Strengthening border cooperation could therefore limit the movement of weapons, constrain armed groups and help the government assert greater authority over historically weakly governed border regions. Syrian authorities have also reportedly arrested Hezbollah-affiliated operatives attempting to deploy rocket launchers in Deraa, illustrating the capacity of these networks. By targeting traffickers and unauthorised armed groups, Damascus could disrupt Hezbollah-linked supply routes under the broader framework of counterterrorism without directly confronting the group.
Securing the border is essential to reversing decades of institutional weakness within the Lebanese state. Hezbollah’s armed autonomy contributed to political paralysis for more than two years after 2022, blocking the parliamentary quorum required to elect a president. Although the deadlock ended in 2025 with the election of Joseph Aoun, following a significant shift in the domestic balance of power. Yet Hezbollah has continued to maintain its own independent telecommunications infrastructure and has reportedly been able to bypass state oversight at airports and seaports, thereby demonstrating the extent to which it continues to operate beyond direct state control and authority.
The dangers of direct confrontation were proven during the May 2008 crisis, when Lebanese government efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s independent telecommunications network triggered violent clashes and the armed takeover of West Beirut, and armed confrontation against Sunni and Druze groups. Attempts to challenge Hezbollah directly therefore risk re-igniting volatile sectarian divisions.
A border-focused strategy offers a politically safer alternative. By presenting bilateral cooperation as a united effort against smuggling, organised crime, and uncontrolled border activity, Beirut and Damascus can pursue shared national interests without explicitly framing their actions as an anti-Hezbollah campaign. Including smaller criminal organisations and trafficking networks within this framework could further reduce Hezbollah’s legitimacy to mobilise domestic support along sectarian lines.
Syria’s post-Assad transition remains constrained by fragmented security structures and limited state capacity. Hezbollah, meanwhile, remains deeply embedded within Lebanon’s political and social fabric, making direct confrontation particularly sensitive. Both governments must also contend with Iran, whose regional interests conflict with reducing Hezbollah’s influence.
However, Damascus and Beirut increasingly recognise their parallel interests. The March 2025 border demarcation agreement and statements by President Ahmed al-Sharaa and President Joseph Aoun suggest a shift towards closer bilateral engagement. While this does not equal a complete strategic realignment, it creates an opportunity to test whether shared interests can produce sustained cooperation.
Ultimately, because the networks sustaining Hezbollah cross both countries, across rugged and difficult terrain, neither government can fully achieve its objectives independently. Coordinated border enforcement offers a realistic method of weakening these networks while avoiding the dangerous costs of direct confrontation. Whether this approach succeeds will depend on both states’ capacity to sustain cooperation amid domestic and regional fragility, historical mistrust, and external pressure.
